Michigan Law Review
Volume 70

Issue 3

1972

Baruch: Wall Street: Security Risk
Lewis D. Lowenfels

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Legal History Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lewis D. Lowenfels, Baruch: Wall Street: Security Risk, 70 MICH. L. REV. 648 (1972).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol70/iss3/8

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

648

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, '10

WALL STREET: SECURITY RISK. By Hurd Baruch. Washington,
D.C.: Acropolis Books. 1971. Pp. 365. $8.95.

Wall Street: Security Risk by Hurd Baruch, a staff member of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, is an interesting and sometimes informative description of certain of the ills that plagued the
· )4.- 2- Mich. App. 705, 141 N.W.2d 848 (1966). See also Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d
474 (Ct. App. Ky. 1951).
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securities industry in America during the latter part .of the 1960's.
Baruch attempts to set before the reader what he feels is
an overview of: the continuing use and misuse of customers' funds
and securities by their brokers; the securities industry's inability to
process customers' orders promptly and accurately during the record
trading volume of 1967-1968; the 1969-1970 financial crisis on Wall
Street; the non-functioning of the self-regulatory system throughout
the whole period; and, finally, the changes which can and must be
made if the securities markets are to be made truly safe for the small
investor. [P. xi.]

Baruch's style alternates between a highly technical presentation
which will be difficult for most nonexperts to follow and a muckraking use of purple prose and catchy phrases which one imagines
are designed to help the book appeal to a wider audience.
In reading Baruch's book one must not forget that he is presently
employed by the SEC and participated as a government investigator
in the financial history that he purports to describe. Baruch's role
was and is that of a partisan and, as such, his presentation of facts, as
well as his conclusions, become suspect. The way Baruch sees it, all
of the ills that he describes may be attributed primarily to the members and staff of the New York Stock Exchange. They are the "bad
guys" who are constantly frustrating the aims and improvements of
the "good guys." The "good guys" are-you guessed it, the staff and
members of the SEC! By a clever juxtaposition of quotations Baruch
paints New York Stock Exchange President Robert W. Haack as a
villain continuously soothing the investing public with pious platitudes while his minions go about their dirty deeds. On the other
hand, SEC officials, among them Baruch's immediate superiors, are
described as working with "intelligence, tact and selfless dedication"
to prevent financial loss to hundreds of thousands of investors (Acknowledgement). Baruch states that "their profound understanding
of the securities industry made them the first to diagnose the seriousness of its problems and to propose the most appropriate remedies"
(id.). Maybe so. But how does Baruch explain the failure of these
same SEC officials to promulgate rules during the emergency dealing
with the abuses prevalent in advertising and promotion, the overexpansion of branch office networks, and the hiring of marginal, inexperienced personnel? Baruch says that the SEC "felt that the
primary responsibility in this area of business practice was one for
the self-regulatory bodies" (p. 131). Similarly, how does Baruch explain the SEC's failure to make its net capital rule applicable to all
broker-dealer firms instead of just non-stock exchange member firms?
He does not; he merely says that it is "indeed unfortunate" that this
vital rule was not made applicable to all firms (p. 176). How does
Baruch explain the SEC's failure to move in and close down certain
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of the firms perpetrating the most serious of violations? He says that
if the SEC took such action it risked depriving the customers of those
firms of the benefits of the New York Stock Exchange's Special Trust
Fund-a dubious proposition. And so on, and so on.
Unfortunately, what is least needed as the industry, the Government, and private persons attempt to reconstruct the securities industry on sounder foundations after the recent debacle is a search
for scapegoats. None of the parties involved, whether they represent
industry, Government, self-regulators, or the investing public itself,
can claim immunity from responsibility for the events that transpired in the securities industry during the late 1960's. During these
years the American securities markets were inundated with an orgy
of greed and speculation that was fueled as much by the desire of
ordinary citizens to get rich quick as by the irresponsibility of the
promoters in the financial community who pandered to these appetites. To single out one group at which to point the finger of blame
for the inevitable debacle is entirely unfair.
As the Congress, the Commission, and the self-regulatory agencies
go about their work enacting new laws and promulgating new rules,
what is needed is not only insight into the problems, but also some
sort of mutual cooperation and trust among the different interests
involved. Not to recognize that there are certain entrenched interests which will fight tooth and nail to retain their special privileges would be naive. It is equally naive to believe that we can make
any meaningful progress if we merely superimpose new antagonisms
and resentments upon those that already exist. Government officials,
if they are to provide the kind of leadership and dispassionate involvement that is so sorely needed, must avoid at all costs becoming advocates for their own special interests. Only in this way can we go
about reconstructing our capital markets, which have long been the
envy of the world, so that they may properly bear the even heavier
anticipated burdens of the 1970's.

Lewis D. Lowen/els,
Member of the New York Bar

